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Abstract—In order to prevent harmful secret information 
sharing by steganography, a new active-warden 
countermeasure approach against steganography is proposed 
in this paper. Differently from the other countermeasure 
approaches presented in current literature which need to have 
some knowledge of the steganographic algorithms to be 
attacked, our proposed method is a generic method which is 
independent of any particular steganography methods being 
utilized. In other words, our approach blindly attacks the 
steganography without any prior knowledge of the used 
algorithms or their existence. In general, the hidden 
information is embedded in a carrier by adjusting the 
coefficients of the audio or image. In our method, by exploiting 
the large margin between the numerical value and visual 
perception of the images, large amounts of visually non-
detectable distortions are incurred in the image. As a result, 
the hidden message is destroyed by this method while the 
perceptual quality of the image is maintained. Inspired by the 
print-scan process in which most of the steganographic 
methods cannot survive, a transform called Discrete Spring 
Transform (DST) is proposed in this paper as the foundation of 
our attack algorithm. An image geometrization method is also 
developed to reconstruct the image in this paper. The 
simulation results have demonstrated that the PSNR of the 
attacked image is above 30dB with a high perceptive quality 
while the BER of the hidden steganographic message in the 
attacked image is above 0.5. 
Keywords—steganography; multimedia security; print-scan 
process; human visual system 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Security is a rising problem in wireless communication 
and networks. Steganography is a potentially strong method 
to transmit secret information especially by hiding messages 
in the multimedia data through networks [1]. Though 
steganography provides a way to transmit hidden 
information,  however, the malicious use of steganography 
draws another stringent security problem. Evidences have 
shown that terrorists use steganography to broadcast 
operation instruction and training manuals on the Internet 
[2]. Consequently, preventing malicious information 
transmission over Internet is a critical issue for public 
security. The prominent difficulty is that the steganography 
will not draw any attention. In other words, it is difficult to 
perceptually identify whether an image/video/audio is hidden 
with some information or not. Furthermore, it is even hard or 
impossible to detect which steganography method is used 
since there are hundreds of existing steganography methods.  
Steganalysis is a kind of countermeasures to 
steganography[3]. Steganalysis tries to detect the 
1.69steganography and detect what information is embedded. 
Many effective steganalysis methods are proposed in the past 
decade [4-8]. Steganalysis may be very useful for analyzing 
a highly suspicious image where some hidden information is 
believed to be embedded with a known steganography 
method. However, most of the steganalysis  is only valid for 
a certain kind of steganography method because the 
mechanism of the steganalysis is based on the specific 
statistic features of steganography algorithms. As discussed 
above, there may be millions of images transmitted  over 
Internet some of which may contain hidden messages by 
hundreds of different steganography methods. Therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to detect which kind of steganography 
method is used for a certain image. Then it is also difficult to 
locate a steganalysis method targeting that steganography 
method. In fact, over Internet, most of the information is 
secure where no hidden information is embedded, so huge 
resources will be wasted if all the images over Internet are 
tested by many different kinds of steganalysis methods.  In 
all, steganalysis as a passive and non-generic countermeasure 
to steganography is not proper for the Internet environment.  
In [11], an active steganalysis method is proposed against 
QIM steganography. It is an active method which is capable 
of detecting whether QIM steganography exists in the cover 
media or not using a measure of entropy which is called 
approximate entropy. It has advantages over passive 
steganalysis which is not able to detect the existence of such 
steganography. However the proposed method can only work 
against QIM steganography. In [12], a learning based 
steganalysis method is proposed. Instead of using the 
common SVM scheme, here an ensemble classifier is 
utilized in [12] to achieve a lower complexity learning 
process. Nevertheless, the learning process requires a large 
amount of test data and only works on known steganography 
methods.  In [13] and [14], active warden approach is 
discussed to eliminate steganography in the Internet traffic. 
The potential advantages for active warden methods are 
investigated. In [15], [16] and [17] are some specific active 
warden based attacking approaches against video, audio and 
image steganography. All those methods attempt to remove 
the steganography in the cover media while preserving the 
perceptual quality of the cover media, but they all require 
some prior knowledge to some extent.   
A generic active countermeasure method is desired to be 
used in many real world scenarios where the prior 
knowledge of the steganographic algorithms may not be 
available at all. In this paper, we assume all the images 
transmitted through a server on the Internet are applied by 
our proposed method. The visual perceptual quality of the 
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output images should be at an acceptable level which means 
that no significant visual distortion can be found in the 
output images. In the same time, the hidden information 
embedded in the compromised images are securely removed. 
It doesn’t necessarily mean the hidden message is totally 
destroyed. It will be found in the next section of this paper 
that rather than destroying the hidden information, the 
position of the hidden information is disordered so that the 
receiver is not able to recover the hidden information. 
Though the exact hidden information is not able to be 
discovered as in the steganalysis method, the malicious 
information spreading will be prevented and the network can 
be kept at a high security level. 
In order to find such a generic method, the steganography 
attack scheme should not be based on any specific 
steganographic mechanisms. In general, the steganography 
methods take advantage of the human visual system to hide 
information. Due to the limitation of the human visual 
system, by properly designing, the slight changes of the 
image’s numerical values either in spatial domain or 
transform domain will not draw significant perceptible 
distortions [7]. This flexibility of the image values provides a 
capacity to carry hidden information. The countermeasure 
also can take advantage of the human visual system. In our 
proposed method, we try to maximize the distinction 
between the human visual perception and the numerical 
value of the image to make the maximum numerical change 
to the image while keeping the image visually unchanged. 
The significant numerical change of the image will make the 
hidden message difficult to be recovered. It should be noted 
that since the idea behind the proposed method is to change 
the numerical value of the image,   the traditional Mean-
Square Error (MSE) measurement is not fair to evaluate the 
image quality of the output image applied by the proposed 
method. In section V, a subjective image evaluation method 
is adopted to validate the results.  
The print-scan is a physical process which generally 
meets the properties of the countermeasure method as 
mentioned above. The state-of-art printer and scanner are 
capable of presenting and recovering a digital image in a 
very high visual quality. However, the numerical values of 
the rescanned image may be largely different from the 
original one. Meanwhile, it is also demonstrated that most of 
the steganography method is not robust to the print-scan 
process [15]. Even though there are a few data hiding 
algorithms which can survive the print-scan process, the 
data-hiding bandwidth or capacity is severely constrained. 
Inspired by the print-scan process, a countermeasure method 
called Discrete Spring Transform (DST) is elaborated in 
section II and section III. A preliminary consideration of 
DST has been initially reported in our previous work [15]. 
Such DST can be tweaked as a countermeasure to 
steganography which is even stronger than physical print and 
scan. In fact, a major distortion introduced by print-scan 
process is geometric distortion to which human visual system 
is not sensitive. It also looks like a spring which are stretched 
a little bit. In every point of the spring, it is stretched at a 
different rate. But the entire spring is stretched smoothly 
where the specific stretching difference in a single point is 
non-noticeable. To make this geometric deviation smarter, an 
Analog Location Transform (ALT) is proposed to make the 
deviation rate inversely proportional to the visual 
significance of the image area. A geometrized image DST 
method is proved to be effective by the simulation results.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The discrete 
spring transform is presented in section II. In section III, 
geometrized image reconstruction method is described. The 
simulation results are shown in section IV. Finally, we draw 
conclusion in section V. 
II. DISCRETE SPRING TRANSFORM 
A. Analog Location Transform 
A major reason why most of the steganography methods 
fail to survive from the print-scan process is the geometrical 
location deviation distortion. The mechanical structure of the 
printer and the aligning error during the print-scan process 
will easily make the original pixels deviate from their 
original locations. This deviation will not remove the hidden 
information embedded in the pixels but it will let the receiver 
unable to locate and synchronously decode the hidden 
information. First of all, the random and variant deviation 
distance is very difficult to be found. Meanwhile, since the 
deviation in each pixel is relatively small and random, this 
deviation distortion cannot make a general impact on the 
perceptual quality of the image. Human visual system is not 
sensitive to this geometrical distortion. This physical pixel 
location deviation can be virtually modeled as an analog 
location transform (ALT). A single dimensional signal 
Discrete Spring Transform can be illustrated in Fig.1 where 
the dash line denotes the original locations of the signal. 
For a M×N  image 𝐴(𝑚, 𝑛) , the ALT-based Discrete 
Spring Transform is presented as 
  𝐴 𝑚, 𝑛 → 𝐴! 𝑚!, 𝑛!  
where 𝑚!𝑛!1 = 100             0              1              0               ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛                ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛  1 𝑚𝑛1    
 (𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ ℤ    𝑚!, 𝑛! ∈ ℝ) 
 
Fig.1 1-D Discrete Spring Transform 
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This transform is a spatial-variant transform which differs 
from a conventional affine transform or geometric transform. 
Please note the variant of the deviation distance ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛  
and ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛  is a key reason why the hidden message in the 
attacked image is unable to be recovered. In order that the 
deviation does not mess up with the relative postion of the 
pixels, the transform functions are confined as ∆!, ∆! ≤ 0 
and ∀  𝑚 = 0  or  𝑛 = 0, 0 ≤ ∆!(𝑚, 𝑛)  ,∆!(𝑚, 𝑛) , ∀  𝑚 =M − 1  or    n = N − 1, ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛   ,∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 ≤ 0 . This 
condition makes sure that the location of each pixel is 
deviated only in relation to its nearby area. The probability 
density function can be expressed as  
 
P ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 = 12γ! , −γ! < ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 < γ!0,   otherwise  
 
where i = 1,2  and 0 < γ! < 0.5 is the variable range of the 
deviation distance. This maximum deviation distance 
provides a reference threshold for the following method 
where the deviation distance is associated with the properties 
of the human visual system. These thresholds will then be 
used for normalizing the deviation distance functions.  
B. Curve Length Method 
In order to remove the hidden information from the 
image, the deviation distance is expected to be as large as 
possible to result in numerical distortions. On the other hand, 
larger distortions will obviously deteriorate the image quality. 
Generally, the distortion is preferred to be involved in the 
image areas where the human visual system is not sensitive. 
It is also reasonable that those areas are more suspicious to 
have hidden information because the change is less 
noticeable. For example, human visual system is more likely 
to notice the contrast of the pixels than the pixel intensity 
itself [10]. Consequently, the area with edges of objects 
within the image has less tolerance for the distortions than 
the plain area. Then larger deviation distance needs to be 
introduced in the plain area. In this paper, we propose a so-
called “curve length” method to model this distinction in the 
image between the high contrast areas and the plain areas, 
and increase or suppress the deviation distance accordingly. 
The curve length method is capable of progressively and 
smoothly manipulating the transition from the plain area to 
the edge area.  
To calculate the curve length map for an image, the 
image is interpolated at first. The 2-D interpolated signal can 
be expressed as  𝑚, 𝑛 = 𝐴 𝑚, 𝑛 ∗𝑊!(𝑚, 𝑛) 
where W! is the interpolation window kernel which is a 2-D 
extension of Lanczos window kernel. The curve length 
between 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑛) and 𝐴(𝑘 + 1, 𝑛) horizontally and between 𝐴(𝑚, 𝑘)   and 𝐴(𝑚, 𝑘 + 1)verticaly can be presented as    𝑙! k, 𝑛 = d𝐴dx x, 𝑛 ! + 1 dx!!!!!!!!  
    𝑙! 𝑚, k = d𝐴dy 𝑚, y ! + 1 dy!!!!!!!!  
In other words, the expression above shows that we can 
manipulate the deviation of the pixel positions in the 2-D 
plane in such a way that the deviation of position is related to 
the pixel values.  
 After the position deviation process, each pixel is moved 
to a new location where the coordinates may not be integral 
due to the nature of analog location transform. A novel pixel 
geometrization method is proposed  in next section to 
reconstruct the image pixels by virtually implementing the 
scanning process.  
III. GEOMETRIZED IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION 
Assume a scanner will scan the image back into digital 
form based on the image which is virtually printed by the 
ALT method. The virtual ink dot position is overlapped due 
to the pixel position deviation and ink spreading. The ink 
volume for each pixel is assumed to be proportional to the 
pixel’s value. As a result, a larger ink volume dot will be 
spread in a larger circle area which can be denoted as    𝐴! x!, y! = πr x, y ! 
where r denotes the radius of the ink dot circle. Considering 
this ink spreading phenomenon and the deviated ink dot 
center point, it is easy to express and manipulate the 
distortion to the virtually printed image. For the scanning 
process, a square-shaped scanning window with side length d 
is defined. The scanning window slides in the 2-D plane 
vertically and horizontally and generates the digitized pixel 
values at discrete locations. The ink volume captured in the 
scanning window is quantified to reconstruct the image 
pixels.  Each ink dot will have impact on a group of neighbor 
pixels. Though the overlap between the scanning window 
and ink dot can be modeled in many different patterns, it can 
be formulated with a concise expression. Fig.2 illustrates 
some examples of the scanned image pixels corresponding to 
the ink dots. The arrows indicate the deviation directions of 
ink dots and the ink dot size is propotional to the pixel value.  
 
Fig.2 Examples of Geometrized Image Representation 
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As shown in Fig.2, one ink dot may be spread into eight 
nearby scanning windows. Therefore nine pixel values are 
affected by this dot after the virtual scanning transformation. 
The ink volume spread by 𝐴 𝑖, 𝑗  to the neighbor pixels can 
be expressed as S !,! i ± 1, j ± 1 = 𝑃! !,! d2 ∓ ∆!   𝑖, 𝑗 , d2 ∓ ∆! 𝑖, 𝑗  
S !,! i ± 1, j = 𝑇 d2 − ∆!   i, j − S !,! i ± 1, j − 1− S !,! i ± 1, j + 1  S !,! i, j ± 1 = 𝑇 d2 − ∆!   i, j − S !,! i − 1, j ± 1− S !,! i + 1, j ± 1  
S !,! i, j = πr! i, j − S !,! i + p, j + q!!!!!
!
!!!!  
where   𝑇 x = r! arccos xr − x r! − x!, 0 ! 
expresses the area in a circle divided by a chord and 𝑃 x, y = 12 S x + S y + xy − πr!4 , 0 ! 
presents the area in the middle of the two intersecting chords. 
Then the reconstructed image or the virtually scanned image 
can be expressed as 
𝐴! 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑆(!,!)(𝑖, 𝑗)!!!!!!!!
!!!
!!!!!  
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The spread spectrum steganography is used in this 
section to evaluate the proposed method. In experiments, 32 
bit-information is hidden in the 256 by 256 images. Three 
different categories images are tested in this section which 
are textures, portraits and animals. Thirty pictures in each 
category are tested by the proposed method.  
A typical result of the proposed attacking method based 
on the DST and virtual print-scan scheme is illustrated in Fig. 
3 with a comparison against the original input image. It 
demonstrates that the artifact of the proposed attack is 
perceptually unnoticeable, even though the hidden message 
has been successfully removed from the image.  In the 
attacked picture, the BER (Bit Error Rate) of the hidden 
information is 0.5 which means the receiver is not able to 
decode the hidden information with a performance better 
than the random guess.  
In our following experiments, the robust spread spectrum 
based steganography which is one of the current main stream 
steganographic methods is targeted for attack. The 
performance data including BER of the decoded stego-data 
and PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) of the processed 
images have been collected to evaluate and validate the 
proposed attacking method. In our experiments, a 32-bit 
secret information is hidden in the 256 by 256 images. Three 
different categories of image are tested in this section which 
include the images featured with textures, portraits and 
animals. The simulation results shown in Fig. 4 are averaged 
values. In Fig. 4, the proposed attacking method is evaluated 
in two aspects including the strength of the attack and the 
quality of the processed images. In order to meet the 
requirement of removing the steganography, the BER of the 
hidden message needs to be close to 0.5. In Fig. 4 (a), the 
side length of the attacking window which is defined as the 
scanning window is changed from 4 to 9. It is shown that the 
attack is not effective when the side length of the window is 
greater than 6. This is because the scanning window allows 
most of the geometrized pixels are gathered into the original 
scanning window. In other words, the virtual scan process 
does not take effect, and the image data are basically the 
same as those in the original image. Therefore less 
distortions are involved between the neighboring pixels, 
resulting in that the stego-data are untouched. When the 
window side length is less than 5, however, the BERs 
become much greater. On the other hand, Fig. 4(b) shows 
that the PSNR of each category of the pictures is above 30dB 
when the window side is 4 to 5, meaning that the processed 
images have been protected to maintain a satisfactory visual 
quality.  
To sum up, the proposed steganography attacking method 
can be very effective in terms of removing the hidden 
message while protecting the hosting image quality. The 
attacking window size is a critical perimeter in designing the 
attack algorithm. Our experiments have demonstrated that 
the algorithm has the best performance when the side length 
of the window is 4 to 5 when the images are of size 256 by 
256.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, we have investigated on how to attack the 
steganography in digital images without degrading 
perceptual qualities of the host images. We have proposed a 
novel approach called Discrete Spring Transform and 
applied this approach into a virtual print and scan process, in 
which the images were virtually converted into different 
domains. Our experimental results have demonstrated that 
the proposed method is very effective in removing the stego-
data, with its BER as high as 0.5 while the qualities of the 
host images are satisfactorily maintained with PSNR mostly 
higher than 30dB. 
 
Fig. 3 Comparison between Original and Attacked Image  
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Fig. 4(a) BER of the Attacking Results for Different Picture Categories 
 
 
Fig. 4(b) PSNR of the Attacking Results for Different Picture Categories 
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